by Frank Morales
 

"Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has faced an important strategic question as to whether and how to intervene in civil and ethnic conflicts. Our entire approach to these conflicts - how we think about them and what actions to take - is enormously affected by our capabilities to quell them by diplomatic, economic, and military means. To date, the United States has been trapped between classic diplomatic table thumping and indiscriminate economic sanctions on the one hand, and major military intervention on the other hand. But there may be a new and effective middle option in the future, one that could lend weight to U.S. crisis diplomacy and offer new capabilities for pressuring adversaries or fighting wars with minimal loss of life. This potential new option could come in the form of nonlethal warfare and weaponry." -Council on Foreign Relations, 1999 (1)
 

"Over the last nine years, peace operations in Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia placed demanding challenges on our soldiers and leaders. The presence of non-combatants and civilians in those operations required our troops to use imaginative techniques when executing missions to avoid endangering innocent bystanders. Having the right tools to execute missions in volatile and dangerous situations enhances the capability to succeed. Non-lethal weapons provide that enhanced capability…Recent history shows that the most likely threats are from civil disturbances…Examples include: (1) Peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina where a local political party paid civilians to demonstrate against the newly elected government…(2) According to news reports, groups organized and instigated civil disturbances in Seattle, WA, to protest U.S. support of the World Trade Organization." -US Army, Center for Lessons Learned, 2000 (2)

Synopsis

Violence requires tools. In order to "pressure adversaries" the generals of corporativist globalization require a global police. Consequently, their attempt to solve the dilemma of "how to intervene" is leading, under the euphemistic Pentagon doctrine of "operations other than war", to the policization of US military forces around the world. And while lethal, full blown Pentagon back-up is assured in at least two global "theatres", corporate/military strategists are fixated upon the task of devising "imaginative techniques" towards consolidating intervention, "short of war". In part, the strategy calls for the training of US and foreign troops to perform police/law enforcement functions, facilitating a more hands-on approach to the requirements of globalization. (3) Armed with "media friendly" so-called "non-lethal weapons", which help to collapse the divide between army and police functions, military force is being structured to "execute missions" against "noncombatant" civilians. So-called non-lethal weapons enable the forces of globalization to effectively work the "middle option"

The US Army, contemplating its new role during these "operations other than war", recognizes that "recent history shows that the most likely threats are from civil disturbances." Given this understanding, it is preparing to counter popular protest and grass roots resistance to the new world order utilizing the latest in "non-lethal" weapons technology. The new weapons are designed primarily for the purpose of social control and the suppressing of civil unrest. The label "non-lethal weapon", utilized strictly for public relations purposes, is straight out of Orwell, designed to mask through language an increase in the overall scope of violence directed against civilians in both warfare and law enforcement contexts. For quite some time, "non-lethal weapons" have been central to US military domestic "civil disturbance planning" in the form of "riot control agents" and other technology. Their use in domestic policing and "corrections" is widespread. US military contingency planning to suppress "civil disturbance" in America, codified as Department of Defense Civil Disturbance Plan 55-2, , code-named, "Operation Garden Plot" (4), though originally conceived for domestic application, is currently being tailored to fit the international military and political requirements of American corporate global domination and social control. 

The bulk of American military/corporate research and development of these so-called "non-lethal weapons" (NLWs) is classified. A secret arms race in the production and fielding of everything from "directed energy weapons" like lasers, stun guns, acoustical blast weaponry, and electromagnetic pulse weapons, to psychotronic and other gases, is building steadily. Sold by their advocates as humane tools of restraint, these "abusable" weapons actually escalate levels of violence.(5) This comes as no surprise though. Violence breeeding violence is the lifeblood of capitalism. The point is that NLWs are designed to fill a tactical gap in the strategy of social control and societal domination, or as the military puts it, designed to fill the gap between "a warning and lethal force". Specifically, NLWs are designed to assist in the control of civilian populations, the so-called non-combatants, especially those who resist the imposed directives of the Pentagon Inc. and its' various "partners". Within the context of "operations other than war", NLWs facilitate the repression of civilians, legally immune as targets of war, by allowing military forces to expand their "rules of engagement" during "military operations in urban terrain" (MOUT). The process, multiplied by police units wielding NLWs, expands the category of combatants. Because NLWs help actualize the police function, they are viewed by a growing sector of the corporate/military directorship as vital. 

"Tactical" uses of NLWs over the last few years have occurred in numerous places including Somalia, Haiti,Yugoslavia, Seattle, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Washington DC. Currently, NLWs, along with their lethal counterparts, are being showcased by Israeli forces, armed to the teeth, against rock throwing Palestinian youth. Lastly, the distinction between "tactical" and "strategic" uses (whole populations) for these weapons becomes moot with the advent, for example, of electromagnetic pulse weapons, which are already "fieldable" for use on urban streets. Strategically, mounted on satellites and/or missiles, they could effectivley pull the plug on whole countries. The electromagnetic "E-Bomb" has been likened by some to the atomic bomb in the potential breath of its destructive capability.(6) These scenarios are not imaginary, or the paranoia of "conspiracy theorists". So-called non-lethal weapons exist beyond the leading edge which has been shown to the public ie. batons, gasses, rubber bullets, bean bags, flash bangs etc. 

In short, the Pentagon and Justice Department, along with their private and academic apendages are spearheading new ways to control, hurt, torture and kill people, here and abroad. In their quest for global rule, they are implementing war by other means against civilians, a "non-lethal" class war. And in their great wisdom they are also studying the "effects" these weapons have on people. Their "human effects advisory panels" quantify human suffering, psychological states, utilizing "virtual humans" and "rheostatic" ("tunable") capability built in to NLWs. First hand "effects" data is also collected at protests billed as "riots" which are viewed by the military as training exercises, who "train to fight and fight to train".

Non-Lethal "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures"
 

Recently, CALL, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, reacting to a growing sense of urgency to field weaponry in step with the requirements of globalization, issued a primer on the subject, entitled, "Civil Disturbances; Incorporating Non-Lethal Technology, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures." (7) According to its' authors, the CALL newsletter is "written by soldiers for soldiers". It is designed primarily for foreign military operations. Chapter one, interestingly, is entitled, "Learning from the riots of the 1990s", and states that "historically, war has been characterized by the application of deadly force. However, recent U.S. contingencies in Somalia, Panama, Cuba, Haiti, and Bosnia-Herzegovina were peace operations…During these missions, soldiers are repeatedly challenged to cope with noncombatants and civil disturbances perpetuated by large, unruly crowds…Recent history shows that the most likely threats are from civil disturbances…Riots tend to be massive…Riots are often carefully organized by factional leaders…Examples include: 1. Peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina where a local political party paid civilians to demonstrate against the newly elected government…2. According to news reports, groups organized and instigated civil disturbances in Seattle, WA, to protest U.S. support of the World Trade Organization…Recent U.S. military involvement in peace operations underscores the need to field non-lethal weapon systems."

The 36 page report, which consolidates both conceptual and technical aspects of NLWs, collapsing the distinction between domestic and international military requirements, "addresses new non-lethal weapons that have been developed based on the latest technologies available today and how to apply them at the unit level." It documents "the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) developed by combat forces executing recent peace operations missions", concluding that "new non-lethal weapons and updated TTP are needed by Army forces to give commanders broader options in applying graduated responses during civil disturbance missions. Non-lethal weapons, TTP, and training provide commanders those options." Frustrated by the incomplete and insufficient guidance offered by U.S. Army Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 1985, which is geared to addressing domestic "disorder", the authors state that "the manual does not take into account the new technological advances in non-lethal weapons and munitions". Further, "there is no Army doctrine on the use of non-lethal weapons and muntions." Consequently, the Army Center argues that "the manual must be updated to include doctrine and TTP on the use of the new non-lethal weapons that are available today" in order "to deal with the civil disturbance threat." 

When the goal of the soldier is "incapacitate personnel" and "to induce the crowds to back off", CALL recommends "the Sponge grenade", which is "currently available" and "is designed to knock down a person up to 30 meters away when hit in the chest or abdomen. The stinger and foam baton round disperses a shot group similar to that of a shotgun…It should be aimed at one individual, such as the principle instigator or leader of the mob inciting the disturbance…so that he can be captured by a riot control 'snatch-and-grab' team." They caution though that "soldiers who used the grenade in training commented that the grenade could easily injure or possibly kill someone if it hit a person in the head." The soldiers will be taught not to worry, that it's the intent that counts. 

The Army Center notes that "tactical commanders should be aware of the types of non-lethal technologies that are being developed." They point out that "federal projects involved in developing non-lethal weapons include: anti-traction technology ("environmentally neutral lubricants"), sticky foam ("adhesive foam that immobilizes individuals"), anesthetics ("tranquilizers, dispensed with gas or darts, that could put people to sleep"), infrasound ("low-frequncy sound generators that incapacitate individuals by causing nausea, disorientation and bowel spasms"), microwave transmitters ("heat skin to an unbearable degree"), lasers ("personnel flashers"), electrical shockers ("electrical shock projectiles"), pyrotechnics ("smoke grenades"), and vortex weapons ("shock wave").

US Army "proponents" for these and other classified weapons are the Army's Infantry Center for "tactical applications", and the US Military Police which "is the proponent for law enforcement applications." The "current plan" dictates that "when a unit is notified to deploy and conduct a non-traditional military operation…it will draw and use a Non-Lethal Capability Set (NLCS) to enhance its force protection and to reduce noncombatant casualties." The "capabilty set" includes such items as portable bullhorns, oleoresin capsicum and CS "riot control dispensers", which according to CALL analysts are intended "to keep rioters out of arms reach of the soldiers conducting crowd-control tactics or engaged in missions where a noncombatant threat exists". In addition, the kit also contains disposable restraints, sting ball/stun grenade, a twelve guage non-lethal area cartridge "to stun/deter two or three people without penetrating the body", a "40mm Crowd Dispersal Round (Area)", and a "40mm Sponge Round (Point)". 

Currently funded NLW "acquisitional programs" are butressed by a series of initiatives in the "technology investment program" where "governmental laboratories, industry, and academia…work together to solve problems", generating "new technological concepts and solutions that meet current or future NL mission needs and requirements." A few of these "new technological concepts" involve "airborne tactical lasers" and "pulsed chemical lasers" that "deliver a massless, blunt shrapnel impact."

CALL analysts note that "in addition to the need for non-lethal civil disturbance doctrine and equipment and the graduated response matrix, effective TTP are needed to employ non-lethal weapons in contingencty operations." They go on to describe ingenious techniques used in Bosnia in "delaying the occurrence of a civil disturbance" in which troops "block(ed) the road on which the busses transported the demonstrators." Brilliant! And yet, so that the soldiers don't get soft fighting a non-war, "preparation for peace operations must be based on sound civil disturbance doctrine…" in which "plans and unit battle drills must be developed for peace operations just as they are for combat." 

Tactically, the direct action Army believes that "information is the key to developing plans for appropriate responses to civil disturbances." With it, "units can dominate a civil disturbance using non-lethal munitions." Domination being the goal, CALL stresses that "non-lethal weapons and munitions should always be accompanied with lethal munitions and the capability to employ them." Although, as the authors note, "at the time of the publication of this newsletter, only grenadiers in rifle platoons were equiped with the 'sponge' M203 rounds. All other soldiers carried the same equipment and ammunition they would use in a combat situation." The report goes on to provide various pointers on suppressing civil unrest eg., "detain personnel who are leading the civil disturbance." It is worth noting that although the TTPs are meant to address possible international "contingencies", "leader training on basic disturbance control procedures" is derived from US Army Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances, written specifically for domestic application.

Directorate for Non-Lethal Weapons

In July 1996 the DoD published Directive 3000.3, "Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons"(8), which "establishes DoD policies and assigns responsibilities for the development and employment of non-lethal weapons." It designates the Commandant of the Marine Corps as "executive agent" for the non-lethal weapons program. An odd choice given the Marines penchant for extreme violence. While the Joint Chiefs would "promulgate joint doctrine", Directive 3000.3 assigns primary "policy oversight for the development and employment of non-lethal weapons" to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. The DoD defines non-lethal technology as "weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or materiel…", utilizing "means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning." Again, these weapons are vital, allowing the bosses to "take military action in situations where use of lethal force is not the preferred option." 

By January 1997, moving to implement Public Law 104-106, Section 219, Nonlethal Weapons Study, the Department of Defense went ahead to officially designate the Marine Corps as the lead agency of a joint program to develop and field nonlethal weapons. Consequently, the Joint Directorate for Non-Lethal Weapons, based at Quantico, Virginia, was set up as the "action office" for the day-to-day activities of the joint (meaning all services) NLW program. A June 23, 1999, Memorandum of Agreement between the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force and Special Operations Command formalized bureaucratic relationships in the NLWs program. Currently, the Directorate has a staff of about 20, oversees a budget for FY2000 of $24 million, which is due to increase to $28 million by 2005. About $11 million dollars of this amount is for Army and Marine "procurement" of NLWs. During January 1999, the Directorate "participated in a static display to the Senate Armed Services Committee", providing "the Directorate with a great opportunity to showcase the Joint Non-lethal Wqeapons Program to Senate members and professional staffers." (9) The chief of the NLW Directorate at the time, Marine Corps General C.C. Krulak, a leading theorist in the area of urban warfare and "military operations in urban terrain", testified before the Senate Committee, displaying various "static" weaponry before the "professional staffers" including "modular crowd control munition" and the "40 mm Crowd Dispersal Cartridge". 

The Directorates' brief is to develop and field NLWs. It is also "tasked" with providing leadership in joint service training, including tactics, communications, crowd dynamics, weapons and munitions, rules of engagement, and the development of rationalizing doctrine and policy. In addition, the Directorate allegedly sponsors all experimentation in NLWs including NLW "advanced concept technology demonstrations" (ACTD) in "military operations in urban terrain" (MOUT). Allegedly, given the proclivities of the separate services to shield their work on NLWs from public view, including the Directorate. In this regard, the Directorate has initiated an "insight" program that will supply it with some information on highly classified single-service (ie. not 'joint') strategic-level nonlethal weapons. In terms of future experimentation, the Directorate is looking at canister-launched area denial systems, nonlethal Claymore mines (command-detonated explosive systems that project hundreds of small hard-rubber balls), and a nonlethal vehicle trap, among others. For the mid-term to 2004, it is exploring bounding nonlethal munitions (i.e., those that leap into the air before firing their pellets, dye, maloderants, or the like.) Since 1999 the Directorate has been an active member of the Defense Joint Radio Frequency Technical Integration Group which deals in the area of high-power radio frequency and microwave applications.

The Directorate conducts an annual solicitation for new ideas as part of its Technology Investment Program, financing two year demonstration projects in order "to provide a decision point for pursuing the technology more formally." (10) Some current projects include the "OLDS canister" which "provides the ability to rapidly disperse non-lethal chemical agents over large areas", "the Taser" which "provides a non-lethal denial device that is effective against dismounted targets. It fires small darts attached to wires that deliver an incapacitating electrical current", the "Non-Lethal 81 mm payload round", a "120 mm NL mortar munition", an "Airborne Tactical Laser (ATL)" which "provides ultra-precision engagement with graduated effects on target and system-level capabilities to support non-lethal engagements", an "invisible laser pulse" which "strikes a target and creates an intense shrapnelless flash-bang burst". Recently, the Directorate "tasked Raytheon to conduct R&D of non-lethal technologies". 

According to US Marine Corps Commandant General James L. Jones, this and other efforts on the part of the Directorate are designed "to leverage 21st Century technology to enable our warfighting Commander in Chiefs to capitalize on a full-spectrum non-lethal capability." (11) Central to capitalizing on NLW capability is maintaining secrecy. In this regard, the Directorate published and is continually updating its' "Joint Non-lethal Weapons Security Classification Guide that will provide policy and guidance, and uniform criteria for the security classification of information on DoD NLWs…Annexes on specific technologies include: Mechanical, Electromagnetic, Acoustic, Chemical/Biological and Lasers." (12) It is also continually updating what the Pentagon refers to as the "NLW Master Plan" 

Despite the classified nature of the bulk of NLW R&D, hidden in "special access programs" and the like, a virtual flood of articles and doctrinal statements on the subject of NLWs have been pouring forth out of the Pentagon in the last few years, part of the DoDs' effort to make NLWs a more explicit part of its arsenal. Some examples include the Marine Corps 1998 "Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons", (13) which among other matters concerns itself with maintaining "the perceived legitamacy of our operations". The Marines believe that "to realize their fullest potential", NLWs "must be capable of delivering varying levels", of a "rheostatic or tunable quality", which "will allow commanders to increase or decrease the degree of influence used to effect compliance." 

In 1996, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), issued its' "Concept for Nonlethal Capabilities in Army Operations" (14) which states that "nonlethal capabilities simply provide the commander additional options for applying military force", and "the necessary means to control populations", and "enforce mandates". The TRADOC document points out that the US Army Infantry Center is the "proponent for tactical applications" of NLWs. The Army Infantrys' 1998 "Branch Concept for Tactical Nonlethal Capabilities" (15) provides "information regarding the tactical aspects of the Army's nonlethal capabilities program…by establishing required future operating capabilities." Some of these "operational capabilities" include tactics to "control a crowd", "incapacitate individual personnel", "deny personnel access to an area", and "clear facilities and structures of personnel". 

Another publication entitled "Multiservice Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons" (16), issued jointly in October 1998 by the Army, Marines and the Navy states that "no longer can force be viewed as either on or off (lethal force or no force) because whole spectrums of threats are present today". Rationalizing increasing levels of violence, and justifying war-making in a new way, the "joint" document states that "today in an operational environment, United States forces regularly perform missions that were almost inconceivable a few decades ago". And while "senior leaders face a new level of public sensitivity and scrutiny concerning the proper role of the military as an instrument of national power", "nonlethal capabilties may provide armed forces with the necessary means to", for example, "control the flow of refugees" displaced as a result of conventional war. And because "increased interaction between US forces and civilian populations has become a feature of contemporary operational landscape", situated within a context of the "expansion of urban culture", within which "the adversary blends in with the local population", NLWs can have the effect of "reducing population alienation" and can "enhance mission accomplishment by preventing individuals or factions from carrying out specified undesirable activities…" 

The Joint Multiservice Publication also notes that some NLWs, "although designed to minimize fatalities and serious injuries, may have effects that could actually discourage their use. Those based on the controlled use of pain, for example, could prove distasteful to the troops employing them, particularly when the target area includes children, the elderly, the handicapped, or others subject to special protection within the context of our cultural heritage." Military aggressors, intent on maintaining the status and privilege (not to mention the profits) of the racist American WASP "cultural heritage" recognize that within the new context of "operations other than war" that "effective use of NLW involve a synergy between PSYOP activities, intelligence gathering, and a professional media/public affairs plan", a "synergy" that will go a long way towards convincing both soldiers and their victems that the "controlled use of pain" is for their own good.

Lastly, an influential 1998 research report entitled "Non-Lethal Weaponry: A Framework for Future Integration" (17) authored by Air Force Major Mark R. Thomas provides commentary and an extensive bibilography on NLWs, including a "cross section of non-lethal technologies and whether the primary target of the technology is anti-materiel (AM) or anti-personnel (AP) in nature". Such a distinction, as if "biodeteriorative microbes", which "degrades road and bridge surfaces, turns aviation fuel to jelly, and eats rubber off vehicle wheels" is completely harmless to persons. Some of the strictly "anti-personnel" items listed include "Infrasound/VLF" or very low-frequency sound which "disorients and frightens" and "interferes with organ functions, causing nausea and bowel spasms", "Neural Inhibitors" which "incapacitates personnel, paralyzing synaptic pathways", "Hallucinogins" or "narcotics that disorient, confuse and incapacitate", "Calmatives" or "sedatives delivered through the lungs or skin", "Neuroblockers" or "tranquilizer darts and anesthetic bullets", "Electronic Rifles" or "stun guns" which "debilitate the central nervous system", "Pulsed High-Power Microwave (HPM)" which "induces confusion, stupor and coma in personnel and animals", "Non-Penetrating projectiles" or "crushing, deforming, spalling systems, including stinger grenades; wax, wood, and plastic bullets" whose "effects vary with shapes, materials, and speed", "Low Energy lasers" including "laser rifles" and "Optical Munitions" or "flash-bang grenades". 

Thomas also states that "the concept of non-lethality, accompanied by the development and employment of non-lethal weapons (NLWs), has been a material element of civilian law enforcement for many years", while "focused consideration of non-lethality and related weaponry by the DOD as an application of the miltiary instrument of power (IOP) is a relatively new yet growing phenomenon." According to the author, "a 1985 US Supreme Court ruling on the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of an unarmed burglary suspect led to the formation of a 'less than lethal' development program within the Department of Justice's (DoJ) National Institute of Justice (NIJ). By 1993, the NIJ had expanded its mission to include the examination and transfer of existing and emerging technologies within the defense and intelligence establishments under an initiative known as the Technology Assessmrent Program (TAP)." TAP involves grants and cooperative/interagency agreements to research NLWs. According to Thomas, "in 1994 the DoD and the DoJ formalized their desire to cooperatively pursue non-lethal weaponry and have developed several prototypes to help law enforcement and military personnel close the wide and dangerous gap that exists in the range of tools available to them." 

Thomas concludes that the Secretary of Defense should "partner with the Attorney General to redraw the increasingly blurred lines between military operations and domestic law enforcement in accordance with applicable statutes". Noting that, "civilian leaders may be more inclined to address future domestic crisis situations using military forces (e.g., drug trafficking, terrorism, natural disasters, etc.) when a broadened military mindset toward conflict instinctively includes non-lethality and NLWs are the mainstay of a soldier's individual equipment issue", Thomas concludes that "as non-lethal confrontation becomes second nature to US fighting forces, one of the few remaining pragmatic objections to their use in domestic scenarios (i.e., the liklihood of lethal military force being exercised against the citizenry) will be radically diminished. This is an ominous prospect to say the least."

Non-Lethal Foreign Relations

Recently, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), a key elite "policymaker" headquartered in New York City, set up an Independent Task Force on Nonlethal Weapons (NLW) inorder "to assess the current status of non-lethal weapons development and availability within the Department of Defense, in light of their potential to support U.S. military operations and foreign policy." (18) The 16 member Task Force, which published its' findings in 1999, was chaired by IBM executive Richard L. Garwin, CFR "Senior Fellow for Science and Technology". Other members of the Task Force included Philip A. Dur, US Navy (Ret.), a Vice President of Tenneco Automotive, having served on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council, David Jones, USN, Commander, Submarine Squadron ELEVEN in San Diego, California. In 1998-9 he served as a "Military Fellow" at CFR, Edward N. Luttwak, member, "National Security Study Group administered by the Department of Defense", Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.), Chair of Mitretek Systems, formerly Chief of Staff, US Army, and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Janet and Christopher Morris, President/Vice President, M2 Technologies, Inc, members US Global Strategy Council. The Task Force Project Director was W. Montaque Winfield, USA, Executive Officer to the Commander of the "Stabilization Force" stationed in Sarajevo, Yugoslavia. He too "served" as a 1998-9 "Military Fellow" at CFR. 

The Council issued an earlier report on the subject in 1995, and regrettably, since that time had "found that the DoD has made only limited progress developing and deploying nonlethal weapons since 1995." The CFR considered the "shortfall" the result of a "continued lack of appreciation for NLW among civilian and military policymakers." Taking a firm line, the Councils' 1999 report recommends that "senior civilian and military leaders should make NLW development a priority." After all, "nonlethal weapons could give policymakers a more potent weapon than economic sanctions." In fact, "used alone", the report notes, "NLW could penalize civilian economies without high civilian casualties." Casualties have a way of impacting negatively on world public opinion. Penalizing civilian economies, on the other hand, being the primary stock in trade of outfits like CFR, the WTO and World Bank, is about dominating the will of civilian populations, forcing them to accept corporate America's agenda as if it were their own. In this regard, "a new emphasis on nonlethal weapons would", according to CFR, "reinforce current American information warfare and psychological warfare capabiltiies."

Mirroring the shrewd cynicism of Department of Defense Directive 3000.3 which states that "non-lethal weapons should not be required to have a zero probability of producing fatalities or permanent injuries" (19), the CFR report states that "it is not the primary purpose of nonlethal weapons to prevent death or major injury." In fact, according to the corporate think-tank, "they are intended to increase the lethality of force used against combatants, while reducing death and injury among noncombatant civilians." For the folks at CFR, NLWs are critical "because they permit military engagement at a lower level of violence." And while "the Department of Defense should pay greater attention to integrating nonlethal technologies with lethal technologies", NLWs are useful "in political terms", where "less violence equals greater acceptability." The circuitous and deceptive logic behind these pronouncements cannot hide the fact that NLWs, which are designed to enable a policicized/politicized military to function "across the entire spectrum of conflict", and to provide "new strategic options for policymakers" (ie. the folks at CFR), are meant to punish and repress civilians who attempt to obstruct corporate/military consolidation of the spoils of globalization, and to do so in an "acceptable" way. To this end, the Council is calling for $100 million per year financing and the centralizing of NLWs development under the National Security Council. 

Finally, CFR executives believe that "on occasion, U.S. security might be improved by a modification of a treaty such as the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological Weapons Convention." For the corporate generals, "conventions" of this sort only get in the way of research, development and "fielding" of new ways to dominate people. In passing, it should be noted that while chemical weapons have been in great display during recent protests around the country, such NLWs, used as "riot control agents" are actually forbidden under international standards for use "as a method of warfare". So while pepper spray is outlawed for use in war, it's ok for use on the streets of America and elsewhere. The corporate strategists at CFR are forced to admit though that "a major uncertainty in the use of nonlethal weapons is the question of human effects." Lacking "an informed judgement of their impact" works devilishly well with the belief that "a zero fatality expectation should not be established" for NLWs. Ultimately, the whole question of "human effects" is for CFR just another aspect of programming for acceptability. Nonetheless, the Council report notes that the Pentagons' Joint Directorate for Non-Lethal Weapons "has set up a human effects advisory panel to guide the acquisition of information adequate to this task", to the task of quantifying human suffering and pain.
 

Virtual Human 

On November 21, 1997 the US Marine Corps "entered into a landmark cooperative agreement with the Pennsylvania State University for the research of innovative ideas, technologies and policies in support of non-lethal defense options." (20) The Institute for Non-Lethal Defense Technologies, part of the Applied Research Laboratory at Penn State, is headed up by Dr. Edward G. Liszka, who stated at the time that "we intend to focus the activities of the new institute on helping the Marine Corps develop what will be viewed as revolutionary new capabilities" and to "examine the medical, psychological and legal effects of non-lethal technologies." As part of the agreement, the Marine Corps awarded Penn State "the first-ever Marine Corps Research University (MCRU) contract, worth up to $42 million over five years." The choice of Penn State for such an endeavor comes as no surprise. The Universitys' Applied Research Laboratory, established in 1945, which oversees the Non-Lethal Institute, has an $80 million annual budget provided primarily by the US Navy. 

An integral part of the Institute is its' recently created Human Effects Advisory Panel (HEAP). Under the sponsorship of the DoD Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, the advisory panel was set up to accurately assess the human effects of non-lethal weapons with a goal of developing validated "incapacitation data" (21). HEAP is the primary human effects advisor to the DoD. According to its' director, Dr. John Kenny of Penn State, "current effects of non-lethal weapons include animal testing, cadaver testing, biomechanical surrogates and some models. Extrapolation of these methods to true human effects is limited. And while it is obvious that the best test subject is human, it is equally obvious that human use requirements are extremely strict." Kenny concludes that the "combination of questionable extrapolation, paucity of human effects data, and limitations on collecting this data, drives the need for realistic non-lethal effects models and simulations" providing a "significant opportunity for the medical modeling and simulation community."

Enter Clay E. Easterly, of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory. In May 1999, the University of New Hampshires', Non-Lethal Technology Innovation Center, a recent recipient (5/00) of a $1.8 million grant from the DoD, sponsored the First Non-Lethal Technology and Academic Research Symposia. It was held at the Marine Corp headquarters, Quantico, Virginia. Co-sponsored by the JNLWD and the National Institute of Justice, Easterly delivered a paper entitled "The Virtual Human: Creating the Biophysical Model" (22) in which he discussed the "virtual human initiative, that is in its beginning stages right now" which aims to solve the problem of human (incapacitation) effects data. Stating that "humans have hundreds or thousands of susceptibilities", Easterly declared that "we need a way to organize these susceptibilities, to be able to play them in different applications, scenarios and conditions." "We should know more about the susceptibility of humans to various kinds of energies" stated Easterly, adding that "at some point you've got to get the cognitive part of the human in there, too, because the mental state is quite important to the response to some kinds of stimulus." Calling for substantial increases in funding in order to "make progress in the more subtle non-lethal devices", along with the identification of "specific disease information", Easterly determines that "we have our eyes on a very long term program, which is complementary to the Human Genome Program" given that "modification to genes will mean changes in susceptibility."

An earlier, February 25, 1998, Non-Lethal Defense III conference at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory in Laurel, Maryland, featured, among numerous presentations, a session by Easterly and M.J.Maston entitled, "The Virtual Human: A Diagnostic Tool for Human Studies and Health Effects in the Twenty First Century" (23). The Oak Ridge National Laboratory is operated by Lockheed Martin Energy Research Corporation for the US Department of Energy. The conference was co-sponsored by the Defense Technical Information Center and the National Defense Industrial Association. The "Oak Ridge Team" presented its' "computational model of the human" which they feel "will provide the capability of evaluating the effectiveness and safety levels for Non-Lethal technologies." It will also be useful as a "design tool for the development of new non-lethal technologies." Presumably able to evaluate "human responses to new scenarios of eqipment and operational conditions", it "will minimize the need for actual human subjects being involved in testing and simulation." According to the presenters, "it has been said that the 20th century was the century of physics, the 21st century will be the century of biology." Seems to me that Hitler said something similar about biology. Nonetheless, todays' biologism is, according to Easterly and Maston, "positioned to play a leadership role in the grand challenge level problem of linking the physics and biology of humans in ways that will permit new avenues or research relating to human function and biomedical applications." 

The "Virtual Human" being developed by the Oak Ridge boys is "a three-dimensional represetation based on the Visible Human data set", "an integrated system of biophysical and other models, data, and advanced computational algorithms." Having it's own web based interface with access from numerous entry points, allows it to serve "as a platform for national and international users from governments, academia and industry to investigate the widest range of human biological and physical responses to stimuli be they biological, chemical or physical." Going far beyond the visualization of anatomy, the Virtual Human will, according to its' sales people, "incorporate physics, such as mechanical and electrical tissue properties and biology from physiology to biochemical information, into the platform so that responses to varied stimuli can be predicted mechanistically and results viewed three-dimensionally." The overall effort at Oak Ridge, in collaboration with the National Institute of Health and the "medical community", is projected to cost upwards of $10 million, with workable prototypes available by 2005. A slide offered by the team during its presentation titled "Applications of the Model" reads as follows: "Explore interface between engineering and medicine", "Advanced monitoring capabilities", "injectable multifunction sensors", "transmit data to model", closing with "Virtual Human is a long term program." 

Another paper presented at the Non-Lethal Defense III conference concerned the "Biological Effects of Non-Lethal Weapons: Issues and Solutions", (24) by Michael R. Murphy, PhD, of the Directed Energy Bioeffects Division, Human Effectiveness Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory. According to Dr. Murphy, "bioeffects include any effect an internal or external stimulus has on part or all of a biological organism.A random sample includes: DNA damage, depolarization of an excitable membrane, muscular contraction, loss of equilibrium, sensory stimulation, sensory blocking, emotional response, nausea, fear, increase in heart rate, avoidance, cellular damage, altered metabolism, confusion, loss of consciousness, convulsions, death." Murphy believes that the technical and operational utility of NLWs systems depend on bioeffects research which provides "the requirement parameters for the system." It does so by determining "areas of human vulnerability." The goal of "incapacitation", or "physical inability (real or percieved)" and/or "mental disinclination" is then further refined, for "in addition to achieving a non-lethal goal, i.e., incapacitiation, operational commanders are also interested in the parameters of the incapacitation", the "dose for main desired effect", and "can the effect be tuned."

Like his associates in the field, Murphy is concerned that "the question always remains of how well research using an animal model extrapolates to the human condition." "After all, "obviously, the best test subject is the human." And although "human use requirements are extremely strict", "insight provided from a carefully done human experiment can be well worth the trouble and risk." With this in mind, Dr. Murphy cites a relevant "protocol" governing "all human research", specifically, AFI 40-402, "Using Human Subjects in RDT&E" as "implemented in the Armstrong Laboratory Handbook for Investigators Involved in Human Experimentation, 40-1, May 95." Ultimately, Murphy assumes that "experience from the actual use of NLWs will provide information that will help improve the weapons themselves, as well as validate the models for future development." Could this be the kind of data the DoD was collecting in Seattle hospitsals during the recent CS gas assualt on anti-WTO protesters? (25)

As is generally known these days, CS or "tear gas", "pepper spray", and a growing battery of other "non-lethal" projectiles, have become prevalent in current police repression of domestic dissent. Many activists have received repeated doses of the stuff during on-going mobilizations. Pepper spray, (oleoresin capsicum), an inflamatory, is a local favorite, because its' more targettable than gases which are at the mercy of prevailing winds. It's also more easily "abusable" by sadistic police as a means of torture. The NY Times reported (11/17/00) that a 27 year old man (Mr. Earl Faison) who was recently falsely arrested in Newark, New Jersey, and who suffered from asthma, "died at Orange Police headquarters after being sprayed in the nose and mouth with pepper spray." It was introduced into law enforcement by the FBI in the late 1980s. Since 1990, there have been at least 60 custody-deaths in which pepper spray was a contributing factor. (26) The 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction (27) defines "riot control agent" as "any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure." Because pepper spray does not appear on the convention "schedule" of toxic chemicals means that it is is allowable as a "riot control agent". Funny thing is, the convention also states, as part of the agreement, that "each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare." In other words, pepper spray, while not prohibited when used for law enforcement, including domestic riot control purposes, is illegal during war, or put another way, is legal when it comes to the class war. To this end, the US Department of Justice recently reported that "in 1997 nearly all local police departments authorized the use of non-lethal weapons by officers. From 1993-1997, the percent of officers employed by an agency that authorized them to use pepper spray went from 69% to 91%." (28) 

Others concerned with the "bioeffects" caused by the "actual use" of these weapons are considerably more definite (or at least open) as to their determinations. The August 4, 1989 edition of the Journal of the American Medical Association, includes an exceptional article entitled, "Tear Gas: Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon". (29) Developed in the 1950s by the Chemical Defense Experimental Establishment (Porton, England) for use in Northern Ireland, CS (o-Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile) is, according to the JAMA article, "a white crystalline substance that is usually mixed with a pyrotechnic compound in a grenade or canister for use", a delivery system perfected by US troops during the Vietnam War. At that time "the United States developed an array of delivery vehicles for CS, including small pocket grenades, the 'Mighty Mite' (a continuous-spray device used in caves and tunnel systems), and 58 kg cluster bombs dropped from helicopters and planes." Tear gases were first synthesized in 1848. They were used, in both lethal and non-lethal forms, during World War I. And although not generally appreciated, the use of tear gases predates the use of lethal chemical warfare, which should alert us to the fact that "tunable" non-lethal violence inevitably equals more lethal violence. 

The JAMA authors note that "tear gas has gained widespread acceptance as a means of controlling civilian crowds…" And yet, "from a toxicological perspective, there is great need for epidemiologic and more laboratory research that would illuminate the full health consequences of exposure to tear gas componds such as CS." Noting ominously that "the possibility of long-term health consequences such as tumor formation, reproductive effects, and pulmonary disease is especially disturbing in view of the multiple exposures sustained by demonstrators and non-demonstrators alike in some areas of civilian unrest", the authors assert that "severe traumatic injury from exploding tear gas bombs as well as lethal toxic injury have been documented." In addition, "the development of tolerance to CS, a phenomenoin that has been confirmed in studies of human volunteers, has likely increased the length and intensity of exposure sustained by some individuals." All in all, citing nearly 50 studies, they conclude that "fact finding missions to areas of civil unrest…have frequently observed security forces using tear gas against peaceful demonstators and not uncommonly against civilians in no way involved in the protests", and "that the evidence already assembled regarding the pattern of use of tear gas, as well as its toxicology, raises the question of whether its further use can be condoned under any circumstances." In 1969, eighty countries voted to include tear gas agents among chemical weapons banned under the Geneva Protocol.

Conclusion

American corporate militarism has seen to it that its technicians of violence are given wide latitude to refine its' tools of pacification and domination. The 21st century "revolution in military affairs" extends the terrain of war-making from land into space (electrical space) (30), from "conventional war" to "operations other than war". It extends the terrain of war-making into the human body and mind as well. Within this context, a well funded sadistic science, searching literally for "the magic bullet", weaponizes anything that can "disable". This new fascism attacks the body utilizing bio-determinist ideology and advanced technical means, necessarily widening its potential targets with each new technological advance and/or political requirement. And given the convergence of the military and police function, central to the new global repression, these new tools of violence are becoming prevalent in "law enforcement" and "correction" circles as well. In fact, these are the areas in which the items are tested, against people of color, already subject to the reality of gulag America. Ultimately, the aim of the Pentagon Incorporated is to meet the challenges of a new kind of war - a generalized, political war against "non-combatants" involved in the class war against corporate exploitation, degradation and death. No longer content to withstand the annoying pressures of democracy, the corporate game plan calls for a more direct-action approach, more repression and less concession. This is the context for so-called non-lethal weapons. Only through a determined effort on the part of a new anti-war movement will we succceed in removing the noose from our collective neck. 
 

Footnotes

1. Council on Foreign Relations, Nonlethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects, Independent Task Force Report, Richard Garwin, Chairman, 1999. http://www.cfr.org/public/resource.cgi?pub!3326

2. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Civil Disturbances; Incorporating Non-Lethal TTPs, CALL Newsletter 00-7, June 2000. http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/00-7/00-7fwd.htm

3. See Sunday Times (UK), 9/3/00, Steven Grey, EU plans armed police force for world hot spots, wherein, "The European Union is working hard to become a player alongside the United States in policing the world." According to the report, "details of the new structure would be kept secret, under regulations quietly agreed by EU governments during the summer that end the right of public access to information about both military and civilian crisis management." See also, NY Times, 11/17/00, Bush Aide Hints Police Are Better Peacekeepers Than Military, wherein Condoleezza Rice, GWs' national security advisor, "speaking from notes", comments that "there may be new roles for international forces of a different type when civil conflict is well beneath the place that combat forces are needed, where police functions are needed."

4. Frank Morales, US Military Civil Disturbance Planning: The War at Home, CovertAction Quarterly, #69, Spring/Summer 2000. www.covertaction.org Article available on-line: http://cryptome.org/garden-plot.htm US Army Field Manual 19-15, Civil Disturbances, designed for domestic use, speaks extensively about the use of "riot-control agents" in suppressing civil disturbances: http://155.217.58.58/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/19-15/toc.htm

5. Steve Wright, War Without Blood? Hypocrisy of 'non-lethal' arms, Le Monde diplomatique, December 1999; see also Steve Wright, An Appraisal of Technologies of Political Control, Report to Scientific and Technological Options Assessment, European Parliament, 1998, and Crowd Control Technology, Working Document for STOA Panel, Luxembourg, June 2000. http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg4/stoa/en/publi/pdf/99-14-01-A_en.pdf

6. Karlo Copp, The E-Bomb - A Weapon of Electrical Mass Destruction, Department of Computer Science, Monash University, Clayton, Australia, 1996. http://www.cs.monash.edu.au/~carlo/

7. CALL Newsletter 00-7, June 2000. Opcit.

8. Department of Defense Directive 3000.3, Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons, July 9, 1996.

9. Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate Program News, Volume 2, Issue 2, February 1999. The newsletter also lists upcoming events "which may be of interest throughout the joint community in the development and fielding of non-lethal weapons", including a February 9, 1999 "event" in Washington DC sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.

10. Technology Investment Programs, Joint Non Lethal Weapons Directorate, April 2000.

11. Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, Quantico, Virginia, http://www.usmc.mil/nlw The busy calendar of recent Directorate events includes an April 6, 2000 "NATO R&TO NLW Exploratory Team Meeting" which took place in Brussels, Netherlands, an April 11-14 "US/UK Wargaming Session/Workshop" at Quantico, and a May 12 session, "US/Israel NLW Data Exchange Agreement Planning Meeting".

12. JNLWD Program News, opcit.

13. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Mariune Corps, Joint Concept for Non-Lethal Weapons, Lieutenant General M.R.Steele, January 5, 1998.

14. Department of the Army, Headquarters, United States Army, Training and Doctrine Command (Fort Monroe, Virginia) Concept for Nonlethal Capabilities in Army Operations, September 1, 1996.

15. Department of the Army, Headquarters, United States Army Infantry Center, (Fort Benning, Georgia), Infantry Branch Concept for Nonlethal Capabilities, April 27, 1998.

16. Air Land Sea Application Center, (Langley AFB, Virginia), NLW: Multiservice Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons, October 1998.

17. Mark R. Thomas, Major, USAF, Non-Lethal Weaponry: A Framework for Future Integration, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama), April 1998. 

18. Council on Foreign Relations, Non-Lethal Technologies: Progress and Prospects. Opcit.

19. DoDD 3000.3. Opcit.

20. Penn State News, "Penn State Awarded First U.S. Marine Corps Research University, Contract Worth Up To $42 Million", June 24, 1999. An earlier news flash, dated 11-18-97, states that the new institute would be "dedicated to developing non-lethal technologies for defense and civilian law enforcement."

21. Dr. John Kenny, Potential Health Effects of Non-Lethal Weapons, First Non-Lethal Technology and Academic Research Symposium, University of New Hampshire, May 1999. 

22. Clay Easterly, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, The Virtual Human: Creating the Biophysical Model, First Non-Lethal Technology and Academic Research Symposium (NTAR I), Quantico, Virginia, May 1999. To support the "mission" of non-lethals, "the University of New Hampshire (UNH) and the JNLWD have begun a partnership for the purpose of providing the U.S. military and law enforcement agencies with access to the nations research professionals." See, Non-Lethal Technology Innovation Center, http://www.unh.edu/ntic/ also http://www.edu/orps/nonlethality/ntar1.htm NTAT II is to take place October 30-November 1, 2000, at the Sheraton Hotel in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. M2 Technologies has been granted $51,277 to help organize the event.

23. Clay E. Easterly, M.J. Maston & the Oak Ridge Team, The Virtual Human: A Diagnostic Tool for Human Studies and Health Effects in the Twenty-First Century, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Non- Lethal Defense III, 25 February,1998, Laurel, Maryland. Conference presentations (slides) can be ascertained via, http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/NLD3/index.html

24. Michael R. Murphy, PhD, Biological Effects of Non-Lethal Weapons: Issues and Solutions, Directed Energy Bioeffects Division, Human Effectiveness Directorate, Air Force Research Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, 1998.

25. Seattle Times, "Clashes, protests, wrack WTO; Police use tear gas against blockade", Nov. 30, 1999. During the assault, several local hospitals "were tracking symptoms of patients" rushed into emergency rooms, "to see if there is a pattern that indicates any sign of bio-terrorism", an effort the hospitals had "been working on with the Department of Defense" for several weeks prior to the demonstration. 

26. Lynn Wilson, Pepper Spray Madness, CovertAction Quarterly, #56, Spring 1996. Also see, New York Times, 11/15/00, "Suspect Dies After Two Officers Use Pepper Spray During Arrest". Based in Bethesda, Maryland, Zarc International Inc., is "the world leader in non-lethal incapacitating weaponry for law enforcement and military application." Founded in 1988, Zarc "is a US Office of Defense Trade Control registered munitions manufacturer" whose clients include all branches of the military and thousands of state and local police agencies. Their specialty is pepper spray, which according to the manufacturer, "induces neurogenic inflammation." http://www.zarc.com

27. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Paris, 1993.

28. United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Local Police Departments 1997, Published 2000.

29. Howard Hu, MD, MPH; Jonathan Fine, MD; Paul Epstein, MD, MPH; Karl Kelsey, MD, MOH; Preston Reynolds, MD, PhD; Bailus Walker, PhD, MPH; Tear Gas: Harassing Agent or Toxic Chemical Weapon?, The Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol.262, No.5, August 4, 1989.

30. See, CTHEORY-Theory, Technology and Culture, Vol.23, No.3, The Kosovo War Took Place in Orbital Space, John Armitage interview with Paul Virilio, October 18, 2000. http://www.cryptome.org/virilio-rma.htm